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Notes
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS-POTESTATIVE CONDITIONS
The plaintiff corporation agreed to hire defendant as division
branch manager for an indefinite term at a guaranteed monthly
salary plus commissions. The contract was terminable at the will
of either party on giving ten days' written notice. The defendant
agreed that he would not, prior to termination of the employ-
ment or for two years thereafter, in any way persuade any
employee or dealer of the company to discontinue his relation-
ship with the plaintiff. Defendant gave the required notice and
terminated his employment. The plaintiff, alleging that defen-
dant violated the agreement by persuading its employees to
terminate their employment and become engaged as employees
in defendant's newly organized business, -sued for damages and
an injunction restraining defendant from violating the contract
stipulation. The lower court, relying on the decision in Blanchard
v. Haber,' invalidated the contract as involving a potestative
condition. Held, that the agreement was a valid bilateral con-
tract. Martin Parry Corporation v. New Orleans Fire Detection
Service, 60 So. 2d 83 (La. 1952).
Article 2024 of the Louisiana Civil Code defines a potestative
condition as "that which makes the execution of the agreement
depend on an event which it is in the power of the one or the
other of the contracting parties to bring about or to hinder."
Article 2034 provides that "Every obligation is null that has been
contracted on a potestative condition on the part of him who
binds himself." However, Article 2035 qualifies Article 2034 by
limiting its operation to "potestative conditions which make the
obligation depend solely on the exercise of the obligor's will.. .. "
(Italics supplied.) Thus it is seen that not every obligation sub-
ject to a potestative dondition is null. To illustrate: If A prom-
ises B that he will sell his car to B if he wants to sell it to B, it is
clear that A is free to perform or not to perform his promise at
his option. Since there is no substantial limitation on A's legal
freedom to choose whether or not he will perform the promise,
his purported obligation is really no obligation at all and should
1. 166 La. 1014, 118 So. 117 (1928).
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come within the nullity prescribed by Article 2034. On the other
hand, if A promises B that he will sell B his car if he, A, should
purchase a new car, A has substantially limited his legal freedom,
although his obligation still depends on the exercise of his will
as to whether he will purchase a new car. Thus, while A's obliga-
tion is subject to a potestative condition, the potestative condition
in question would seem not to fall within the provision of nullity
of Article 2034 because the obligation does not depend solely
upon an exercise of the obligor's will but upon his doing an act,
that is, purchasing a new car. Where the line of nullity contem-
plated by Articles 2034 and 2035 is to be drawn in the case of
obligations depending upon the doing of some act by the obligor
should depend on whether or not there is a substantial limitation
on the obligor's legal freedom of choice.
The obligation which is wholly dependent for its execution
on the will of the obligor-where there is no substantial limita-
tion on the obligor's legal freedom-is termed by the French
writers2 as an obligation subject to a purely potestative condi-
tion. This obligation subject to a "purely" potestative3 condition
is substantially the same as the illusory promise at common law.4
The problems involved in employment contracts which con-
tain potestative conditions may be illustrated by the following
hypothetical situation: A and B enter into a contract whereby
A promises to employ B for ten years but retains the right to
terminate the employment at any time. B promises in return
that on termination of the employment he will not compete with
A for five years. A's promise is illusory or subject to a "purely"
potestative condition in that he has not bound himself to employ
B for any given length of time. The promise would be unenforce-
able and void as a promise to employ for ten years both at com-
mon law5 and at civil law.6 Further, at common law A's illusory
promise would not be a sufficient consideration for B's return
promise not to compete.1
The articles of the Civil Code on potestative conditions go
no further than to declare that the obligation subject to a potesta-
2. 2 Colin et Capitant, Droit Civil Franeais, no 393 (8 ed. 1936); 17 Laurent,
Principes de Droit Civil, no 55 (2 ed. 1876); 7 Planiol et Ripert, Traite
Pratique de Droit Civil Frangais, no 1028 (1931).
3. For purposes of terminology "purely" potestative will be used to denote
that obligation declared null by Article 2034.
4. 1 Corbin, Contracts 487, § 149 (1950).
5. Id. at 461, § 145.
6. Art. 2034, La. Civil Code of 1870.
7. A.L.I., Restatement of Contracts, § 79 (1932).
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tive condition is in itself null and void. Whether the return obli-
gation (B's promise above) in what appears to be a bilateral
contract is also null should depend on the cause8 of that return
obligation, for at civil law an obligation need not be supported
by consideration.9
In the situation posed above there are two possibilities with
respect to B's intention in making his promise: (1) that B was
seeking from A a promise to employ for a definite period of time,
or (2) that B was seeking to secure an employment at will in
return for his promise. The only way to know whether one obli-
gation has been made to rest on another obligation is to inquire
into the intention of the party promising, that is, to determine
the cause or motive of the promisor's obligation. Thus if the
cause of B's promise was to get a valid and binding return obli-
gation of A to hire him for a definite length of time and in fact
he received no such return obligation, then B's obligation was
contracted under error as to principal cause 0 and would be with-
out effect."-
On the other hand, reciprocity of obligations is not the
essence of a contract,12 and it does not necessarily follow that
when one obligation in what may appear to have the form of a
bilateral contract is subject to a "purely" potestative condition
the entire contract will be struck with nullity. This is the posi-
tion taken by many of the French authorities, 13 who go on to say
that in such a case the contract ceases to be bilateral and becomes
unilateral. But for such a rationalization to hold true the obligor
8. Art. 1896, La. Civil Code of 1870: "By the cause of the contract, in this
section, is meant the consideration or motive for making it; and a contract is
said to be without a cause, whenever the party was in error, supposing that
which was his inducement for contracting to exist, when in fact it had never
existed, or had ceased to exist before the contract was made."
Art. 1824, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The reality of the cause is a kind of
precedent condition to the contract, without which the consent would not
have been given, because the motive being that which determines the will,
if there be no such cause where one was supposed to exist, or if it be falsely
represented, there can be no valid consent."
9. Art. 1779, La. Civil Code of 1870: "Four requisites are necessary to the
validity of a contract: 1. Parties legally capable of contracting. 2. Their
consent legally given. 3. A certain object, which forms the matter of agree-
ment. 4. A lawful purpose."
10. Art. 1825, La. Civil Code of 1870.
11. Art. 1893, La. Civil Code'of 1870.
12. 2 Larombire, Th~orie et Pratique des Obligations, 358, Art. 1174, no
11 (1885).
13. 2 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Barde, Traite de Droit Civil, no 782 (2 ed.
1902); 7 Huc, Commentaire du Code Civil, no 246 (1894); 2 Larombire,
Th~orie et Pratique des Obligations, 358, Art. 1174, no 11 (1885); 17 Laurent,
Principes de Droit Civil Frangais, no 64 (2 ed. 1876).
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must have intended that his obligation should stand alone, for
the reality of the cause is a precedent condition to the validity
of an obligation. Hence, if B's determining motive was to get the
employment and the salary and the experience to be received
therefrom, notwithstanding that he was not being assured em-
ployment for a definite length of time, then B's obligation should
be held to have a real cause and to be valid and enforceable.
In the Blanchard case the plaintiff agreed to employ the
defendant as a dentist for a period of ten years at sixty dollars
a week. The contract further stipulated that either party could
terminate it on giving thirty days' notice. The defendant agreed
that for ten years following such termination he would not prac-
tice dentistry within five blocks of plaintiff's office. The court
in effect seemed to divide the contract into two parts, the first
containing the plaintiff's obligation to pay defendant for services
rendered and defendant's return obligation to work for a stipu-
lated salary, and the second containing defendant's obligation
not to compete and plaintiff's supposed obligation to hire him
for ten years. In dealing with the second part of the contract,
the court found that plaintiff's obligation to hire defendant was
terminable at will and was therefore subject to a potestative
condition. The court also looked at defendant's return promise
in terms of how much he received for it and found an absence of
serious consideration 14 to support defendant's obligation as re-
quired by Article 2464. The court thus concluded that, there
being no mutuality of obligation, defendant's obligation was not
enforceable against him.15
Although the court in the Martin Parry case came to a sound
conclusion 6 and did not involve itself with questions of serious
14. The so-called doctrine of serious consideration asserted to be "as old
as the civil law itself" was injected into Louisiana law by the decision in
Murray v. Barnhart, 117 La. 1023, 42 So. 489 (1906). But see Brown, The
Potestative Condition in Louisiana, 6 Tulane L. Rev. 23 (1931).
15. The rationale of the Blanchard case was substantially followed in
Cloverland Dairy Products Co., Inc. v. Grace, 180 La. 694, 157 So. 393 (1934);
Shreveport Laundries, Inc. v. Teagle, 139 So. 563 (La. App. 1932); Cali v.
National Linen Service Corp., 38 F. 2d 35 (5th Cir. 1930).
The precise problem presented in the Blanchard case could not again
arise because of Act 133 of 1934 (now La. R.S. 1950, 23:921) declares all provi-
sions of contracts whereby the employee agrees not to engage in a competing
business on termination of his contract of employment to be null and
unenforceable. However, the general problem as to other restrictions agreed
to by employees does not fall within the statutory prohibition.
16. The court concluded that the defendant's obligation was a "perfectly
lawful promise based on reasonable grounds, i.e., the salary and emoluments
to be obtained in the position of Branch Manager."
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consideration, " there is in the opinion language which perpetu-
ates the existing confusion concerning the potestative condition.
Specifically, the court states,5 "And there is nothing conditional
about the promise [the defendant's promise not to entice away
plaintiff's employees]; it was absolute-defendant agreeing that,
upon the occurrence of a certain event-the termination of
employment-he would not disturb the other employees of plain-
tiff. Albeit, it is difficult to discern why the agreement is said to
contain a potestative condition." Later in the opinion the court
declares, "Surely the absolute promise of defendant to desist from
interference with plaintiff's employees and dealers after the ter-
mination of his employment bears little resemblance to a potesta-
tive condition as defined by Article 2024 of the LSA-CC." As a
matter of fact, the defendant's obligation is not subject to a
potestative condition which would operate to nullify the obliga-
tion. At any rate, the case should not turn on whether or not
defendant's obligation was subject to a potestative condition but
whether it would be binding on him if plaintiff's promise was
subject to a potestative condition. If plaintiff's obligation to hire
defendant for an indefinite term is terminable at his will, then
he is not in effect bound to give defendant employment for the
stated period. This being true, his obligation is null within the
meaning of Article 2034. The question then reduces itself to a
determination of whether the defendant's obligation can stand
alone or must fall with the plaintiff's.' 9 Suffice it to say, the
defendant in the instant case seemed to intend that his obligation
should stand alone and that the cause of his obligation was not to
get a return promise, but rather to get the employment, salary
and benefits therefrom regardless of the length of time the
employment should continue. Therefore, the defendant's obliga-
tion should be enforced against him.
Despite the approach generally taken20 by the Louisiana
courts in dealing with employment contract cases, they have
generally reached desirable results. Probably underlying all their
17. If the court considered at all the question of serious consideration,
and it would seem that they did not, then it can be said that they found that
the defendant's obligation was supported by serious consideration in the
form of the salary and benefits to be gained from the employment.
18. 60 So. 2d 83, 85 (La. 1952).
19. See supra, p. 514, where this question is considered.
20. But cf. Cust v. Item Co., 200 La. 515, 8 So. 2d 361 (1942), where the
court, in dealing with a stipulation not to compete in what purported to be a
contract of partnership, held the stipulation null as being contrary to public
policy. The court made no mention of potestative conditions or serious con-
sideration.
19531
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concern with potestative conditions, serious consideration and
mutuality of obligations is an ultimate concern with the ques-
tion of whether the particular stipulation not to compete is
opposed to the public policy forbidding unreasonable restraint
of trade.21
Charles W. Howard
PRACTICE--SURVIVAL OF ACTION
Plaintiff was injured in a fall in defendant's theater and
instituted suit to recover damages. Judgment was rendered in
the district court several years later denying recovery. Plaintiff
took a devolutive appeal, but pending the appeal she died. Her
husband, nearly five years later, petitioned the court of appeal
to be made plaintiff. This the court of appeal refused to do, but
remanded the case to the trial court to receive evidence of the
husband's capacity to prosecute the appeal.' Defendant applied
to the Supreme Court for a writ of review, contending that judg-
ment should have been rendered dismissing the husband's peti-
tion. Held, that since the wife had been cast in judgment in the
district court, her right of action had not become a property right
capable of passing to the husband by inheritance. "The only
right to which the husband succeeded was the statutory survival
of action under Article 2315 which had to be exercised in accord-
ance with the terms of the statute. .. ." The court expressed a
belief that Act 239 of 1946 had been impliedly repealed by Act 333
of 1948, amending and reenacting Article 2315 of the Louisiana
Civil Code. Gabriel v. United Theatres, Inc., 221 La. 219, 59 So. 2d
127 (1952).
In the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825, the corresponding article
to the present Article 2315 contained no provision for survival of
actions in tort after the death of the injured person.2 By amend-
ment to this article in 18553 the tort action of a deceased survives
in favor of certain designated beneficiaries, who may bring the
action of the deceased in their own right. But this right is limited
by a prescriptive period of one year. The court has always inter-
21. See Shreveport Laundries, Inc. v. Teagle, 139 So. 563, 567 (La. App.
1932), where the court in referring to the Blanchard case said, "It is con-
ceded that the court could have justifiably held the contract invalid as being
against public policy."
1. Gabriel v. United Theatres, 50 So. 2d 514 (La. App. 1951).
2. Art. 2294, La. Civil Code of 1825.
3. La. Act 233 of 1855, amending Art. 2294, Civil Code of 1825.
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